INTRODUCTION
Does time heal all wounds? Can a transitioning democratic society move forward without fully facing the human rights violations that plague its past? Or can only truth and justice reconcile large-scale abuses? Difficult lessons from the recent past have taught societies and nations that legitimate democracies require political and personal accountability reinforced by the rule of law.
2 International human rights treaties thus impose upon states a duty to investigate, criminally prosecute, and punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
3 Although state actions taken in response to gross violations of human rights are never truly adequate when communities, families, and individuals suffer irreparable harms, inaction is invariably worse. 4 A state's failure to respond appropriately and justly to gross human rights abuses can give victims the sense that their perpetrators emerged either victorious or with clean hands. 5 The Peruvian government's response to twenty years of human rights abuses from 1980 to 2000 included creating a truth commission with a broad mandate to "promote national reconciliation, the rule of justice and the strengthening of the constitutional democratic regime."
6 By forming the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR),7 the State initiated a process of achieving national reconciliation through an attempt to correct the historical record, provide a collective memory and preserve the possibility of criminal accountability and justice. silenced in the future processes of truth and reconciliation. 13 Furthermore, with Peru's current step toward accountability and transitional justice-the trial of former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori-advocates and other members of civil society must push for reproductive justice for the victims-survivors of enforced sterilization in Peru in order to move toward truth, justice, and reconciliation for all.
1 4
This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced sterilizations cases in the CVR's investigation and Final Report effectively erases State responsibility and greatly decreases the likelihood that Peru will seek justice for the victims of these violations of reproductive rights. Part I provides an overview of the sharp cultural and economic divides in Peruvian society, examines the history of violent conflict in Peru from 1980 to 2000, and recounts how healthcare providers violated Peruvian women's reproductive rights when they sterilized low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women either against their will or without informed consent through the State's Family Planning Program. Part II discusses the creation and implementation of the CVR through its executive mandate. Part II challenges the reasons for excluding these cases in the Commission's investigation and Final Report and also examines the effects of these omissions. Part IV proposes an independent inquiry with regard to these abuses and advocates for a more inclusive investigation and final report for future truth commissions whose goals include truth, accountability, and justice. 
I. THE PATHS TO VIOLENT CONFLICT

A. Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Society
Tawantinsuyu's 15 destruction and Peru's birth began when the Spanish Conquistadors invaded Incan lands, captured the last Incan ruler, Atahualpa, and massacred thousands of Incan warriors in the Andean city of Cajamarca in 1532. 16 During the first one hundred years of colonial rule and oppression in Peru, the indigenous population in the Andes region plummeted from nine million to six hundredthousand people. 17 From this swift defeat and near destruction of the highland indigenous peoples of Peru emerged the myth of the "vanquished race": that the Incas and their descendants lacked decisionmaking ability and individual initiative and, thus, "could or should be exterminated, 'civilized,' instructed, or saved."
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Spanish colonial rule guaranteed impoverishment and death for many indigenous Peruvians and perpetuated the fragmented and divided structures that continue to exist in Peruvian society today. 19 First, a geographical divide exists between the coastal region-predominately urban, white and Spanish-speaking-and the highlands-mostly rural, indigenous and Quechua-speaking. 20 In addition, the coastal region boasts an overwhelming majority of the nation's wealth and political power, and, as a result, political and economic programs in past regimes have largely ignored or neglected the needs of the indigenous peoples in the highlands and rainforest regions. 21 Moreover, there are racial and ethnic gaps that divide Peruvian society among groups of Spanish descent (criollos), mixed Spanish and indigenous descent (mestizos), indigenous of Andean origin who have moved to the urban cen-ters of the country (cholos) and indigenous who continue to live a more traditional way of life in the highlands (indigenas). 22 Although today indigenous groups are beginning to organize politically and socially to demand individual and collective rights from the State, 23 invidious discrimination and economic, cultural and social divides still exist at all levels of Peruvian society. 24 In Peru, indigenous peoples continue to be seen as second-class citizens, a racist view established through these divides, their situations of extreme poverty, and the inadequate access to basic health care and education. Next, the absence of a strong, unchallenged democratic transition, combined with the presence of the revolutionary movement of the Shining Path, caused the government to react with authoritarian rule and military force, which then served to escalate the initial outbreaks of violence. 32 Fernando Belainde's newly-elected government, in response to increasing social unrest, imposed states of emergency in departments throughout the country. 33 In addition, the Armed Forces used racial profiling and killed indiscriminately in areas of conflict with the Peruvian government's knowledge and acquiescence. 3 4 In this context, the Shining Path gained support and momentum as some rural peasant communities began to view the guerillas as the lesser of two evils during the beginning of the armed struggle.
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At first, certain peasant communities, such as those in the district of Chuschi, also backed the Shining Path's efforts because the Shining Path's short-term goals aligned with their own: to drive out enemies in their towns who were gaining power, to establish better-quality 34 See Degregori, supra note 20. 35 See id. The slogan at the time was that the "Shining Path has one thousand eyes and one thousand ears," while the State fights blindly. Id. schools, and to end government corruption. 3 6 To some communities, the revolution and "New Peru" meant that they would finally free themselves from abusive bureaucrats and public officials and return to the consensus framework with which traditional authorities governed in the past. 37 In time, however, the Shining Path began to reorganize peasant communities toward its ideology of a "future without distinctions" in class or wealth and to assume authoritarian power over them; as a result, the Andean people came to see the Shining Path as nothing more than new oppressors. 38 "[I]nstead of becoming the revolutionary vanguard in the communities, Shining Path [was] perceived.., as a new form of haqa, the supernatural being that robs body fat" in Andean mythology to pay off a debt. 39 The Shining Path eventually lost what little peasant community support it had, and Andean citizens complied with military orders to organize civil defense patrols in order to resist the efforts of Shining Path insurgents. 40 The Shining Path focused its class war in the countryside, the "principal theater" of its actions, and complemented these efforts by supporting armed strikes and mobilizations in the city. 41 At first, the Shining Path's motives remained a mystery to most urban Peruvians; the cryptic messages-"Teng Hsiao-ping, son of a bitch" -wrapped around dead dogs hanging from streetlamps in Lima seemed to them to border on insanity. 42 Soon, however, the dynamite attacks and killings intensified, and the uprising turned into a bloodbath that could no longer be underestimated or ignored. 43 While the Armed Forces devised new strategies to defeat the Shining Path, the nation's social and political composition shifted under the structural factors of a modernizing Peru. 44 First, a significant number of Peruvians migrated from the rural areas to the cities, largely due to the development of a market economy, increased transportation, and as displaced persons of the armed conflict. 45 In addition, the relatively 36 1sbell, supra note 30, at 89-90. 43 See id. at 94-95, 104. The Shining Path developed the idea of the "quota": the willingness and expectation of its members to sacrifice their own lives when asked to do so by the party. Id. at 104. Degregori, supra note 20. 45 See id. The number of desplazados (internally displaced persons) exceeded 600,000 at the height of the armed conflict. Id. Guzmin's capture followed Alberto Fujimori's election in 1990 and "self-coup" (autogolpe), which abruptly ended the rule of law in 1992. 48 Fujimori implemented a strategy to combat an economic crisis and government subversion; he suppressed civil liberties and eroded political institutions and notions of accountability. 49 Then, when faced with congressional opposition to his oppressive measures, he joined forces with the military, suspended the Constitution, censored the media, dissolved the National Congress, and incapacitated the judiciary.
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Even after the capture of the leading subversives and the awareness of a crumbling insurgency, Fujimori's repressive authoritarian regime used public fear and isolated incidences of violence to justify continued human rights abuses and political suppression throughout the 1990s. 
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See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the media as investigators, "informal ombudsmen," and as a channel for opinion and information in Peruvian society); Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, the Shining Path did not have an alternative to offer the peasant populations after the destruction of the "old order." Degregori, supra note 20. Most significantly, the movement ignored the needs of the peasant families in the Andes. Degregori, supra note 20. 47 See Degregori, supra note 20; Gonzhlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; see also Stern, supra note 28, at 297. 48 See Gonzfilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; Stern, supra note 28, at 417; see also tional and domestic pressures existed to address the widening gap among socio-economic classes of Peruvians; thus, Fujimori's government promoted contraceptive services to "the most deprived sectors of society" in a stated effort to alleviate poverty on a massive scale. 58 During this time, Fujimori continued to actively promote universal access to contraception for women. 5 9 His political discourse invoked principles of social justice and human rights; his rhetoric even included using the reproductive justice movement's language, stating that "poor women deserved the same opportunity as wealthier women to regulate their fertility, and [that] all women had the right to control their bodies and use contraceptives if they wished." 60 With Fujimori's control over Congressional action, the Ministry of Health soon drafted its first comprehensive reproductive health program. 61 Additional government measures-including creating agencies and passing laws-also stressed the importance of equality between men and women.
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The government's aggressive Family Planning Program focused on increasing the number of sterilizations performed on Peruvian women and specifically targeted the low-income, indigenous women at the margins of society. 63 Moreover, government officials determined annual numeric goals and targets for the sterilization programs and initiated an obligatory quota system for health care providers to meet as program employees in order to remain employed, obtain monetary compensation, or receive a promotion. 64 Later investigations revealed that health care provider practices included compensating women and subjecting them to aggression, intimidation, and The fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children-they are poor and are producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people's fertility. Thus, demographic goals are a combination of the population's right to access family planning and the government's anti-poverty strategy.
Coe, supra note 29, at 61-62. 59 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138. 60 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138-39. 61 Coe, supra note 29, at 60. 62 Id. at 61.
humiliation-all measures that did not include informed consent.
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For example, health care providers denied women their fundamental rights to informed consent when professionals pressured women to undergo surgical sterilization during "Tubal Ligation Festivals" and at locations designated for food aid distribution. 6 6 Some providers offered women surgical sterilization as the only free method of contraception available. 67 Other health workers did not provide women with information regarding other available birth control methods and many times deliberately gave inaccurate information about the risks and consequences of surgical sterilization procedures. 68 Some women even reported that professionals in clinics and hospitals intimidated them as they sought medical attention for abortion complications.
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The practice of State-sponsored enforced sterilization also caused numerous deaths due to medical negligence and malpractice. 70 Human rights groups brought one illustrative case, Maria Mamrita Mestanza Chfivez v. Peri, to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights when a thirty-three-year-old, low-income, illiterate woman with seven children died after a coerced surgical sterilization procedure.
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Health officials falsely accused Mestanza of violating the law by having more than five children and threatened to report her to the authorities if she did not submit to surgical sterilization. 72 Health care providers succeeded in coercing Mestanza to undergo a tubal ligation procedure and failed to examine her prior to the surgery. 73 Following the tubal ligation procedure, the health center released Mestanza 65 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. Coe treads lighdy on blame when talking about the abuses that occurred. See id. She shows how sterilization was promoted through services that withheld temporary methods of birth control, such as injections and birth control pills. Id. She does conclude by saying that "[b]latant deception, economic incentives and threats were also used," but she does not mention the extent of the abuses. even though they were aware that she suffered from serious complications as a result of the surgery. 74 A few days later, Mestanza's partner attempted to seek emergency medical care from physicians at the health center, but the physicians refused and reassured him that the effects of the anesthesia had not yet worn off. 75 As a result, Mestanza died in her home nine days after her surgical sterilization.
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Coerced and forced sterilization practices contradict Peru's constitutional and legal protections for its citizens. 77 At first, human rights activists and non-governmental organizations criticized the government's focus on high numeric goals that were bound to lead to abuses, as the practices were extremely secretive. 78 Later, women's advocacy groups documented the specific instances of abuse and sent their findings to the Public Ombudsman on Women's Rights. 79 Finally, in December 1997, La Repfiblica, one of Peru's major newspapers, reported an independent investigation and detailed findings on the population policy implementation that shocked the public. 8°O nce the general public became aware of the extent of Fujimori's demographic policy, a heated debate ensued. 8 Other organizations then backed the report and also pressured the Peruvian government to take action to reform its policies. 83 In March 1998, the Ministry of Health agreed to make changes and reform sterilization services; it eliminated the quotas and implemented new counseling guidelines, a consent form, a three-day waiting period before the procedure, a day to recover in a hospital after the surgery, and certification of health care facilities and physicians. 84 Additionally, in 2001, the Peruvian government agreed to settle the case pending in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by compensating Maria Mestanza's family and by taking responsibility for violating individual human rights, including the rights to life, physical integrity and humane treatment, equal protection, and the right to be free from gender-based violence. 85 As part of the settlement, the government promised to investigate other enforced sterilization cases and to punish those who had violated Peruvian and international law. 86 At the time of this writing, however, the Peruvian government has not fully complied with its commitments under the Mestanza settlement.
II. THE PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:
ITS MANDATE AND FINDINGS Soon after the government reformed its Family Planning Program, Peru's transition to democracy began in September 2000. 88 This regime change was not due, however, to public outrage at the atrocities committed during Fujimori's regime, but was largely the result of televised videos that uncovered a political corruption scandal and implicated high-level government and military officials, including the head of Peru's intelligence service, Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), Vladimiro Montesinos. 89 Fujimori fled the country in November 2000 and resigned as president via fax from Japan. 90 Thus, unlike the Chil- ean or El Salvadoran transitions, Peru's was a total regime collapse without a negotiated arrangement, peace accord, or guarantee of impunity. 91 The peaceful transition to Valentin Paniagua's interim government and the favorable conditions for democratic transition-the complete collapse of authoritarian rule and the absence of a powerful insurgency-provided an opportunity to critically examine the past and to establish a legitimate democratic regime that would guarantee future individual and collective human rights-including reproductive rights-in Peru. 92 In response to public and social group pressure, the newly-formed government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) 93 08 Thus, the findings demonstrated that victims of the armed conflict were overwhelmingly low-income, rural, indigenous peasants with little or no political or economic power in Peruvian society.' 9 As for those responsible for the conflict and its outcomes, the CVR promoted a comprehensive and inclusive notion of accountability." 0 The Final Report found State limitations in protecting fundamental rights of its citizens and securing the public order, as well as breaches of the constitutional order and rule of law in numerous moments of crisis throughout the internal conflict."' Although the two terrorists groups--the Shining Path and the Tfipac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)--carried the bulk of the responsibility for systematic abuses and violence during the armed conflict, the Report also held state, political, and social entities responsible for many of the gross human rights 107 See Degregori, supra note 20. 108 Id. The Final Report also gives the astonishing statistic that according to the 1993 census, only sixteen percent of the Peruvian population were native Quechua-speakers. FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 1(6). Also, the people from these regions together represent only nine percent of the income of all Peruvian families. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 15.
109 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 1(6); Degregori, supra note 20.
110 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, passim (holding accountable the Shining Path, the MRTA, Peruvian police and Armed Forces, self-defense committees, the various government parties in power during the conflict, the Peruvian legislature and judiciary, trade organizations, the educational system, the Church, human rights organizations, and the media).
M See id. at 1(10)-(l11 Because the Executive gave the CVR a sufficiently broad mandate to include State-sponsored enforced sterilizations, the Commission's omission was a self-imposed, interpretive-albeit inattentive-restriction on the Commission's investigation and Final Report." 6 Of course, truth commissioners must make certain choices as to which cases commissions investigate and report as a result of time constraints, resource limits, insufficient information, unreliable evidence, repetition of wrongs already documented elsewhere, and political pressures.
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Reports should not, however, exclude cases of gross human rights violations if the effects are to perpetuate discrimination, racism, and classism as well as to impede justice, including reproductive justice, for vic- [T] he practice of rape and other sexual crimes should be fully acknowledged in a commission's report where it is believed such a practice was widespread. If a truth commission does not take special care in addressing this issue, it is likely that it will remain largely shrouded in silence and hidden from the history books-and also likely that few policy, educational, or reparatory measures will be put in place to assist past victims, increase the public understanding of the issue, or reduce the prevalence of sexual abuse in the future.
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In the cases of enforced sterilizations, the CVR did not make such a conscientious, inclusive effort. 122 As a result, impoverished, indigenous Quechua-speaking women continued to face multiple layers of discrimination-including social, racial, and gender discrimination-first as victims and later as unrecognized victims of State repression and denial of basic human rights during the twenty-year internal conflict.
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Thus, the omission of enforced sterilization cases excluded women who were already members of socially and politically marginalized groups and greatly decreased their chances for truth, accountability, and justice in Peruvian society.
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The CVR Commissioners could give reasons for excluding enforced sterilization cases from their investigation and report, such as the mandate's restriction or the repetition of other investigations or reports, but none should outweigh the reasons to include such widespread, Statesponsored violations of reproductive rights as part of Peru's official collective memory. 125 Unlike the South African TRC, however, the Peruvian CVR's executive mandate did not limit the scope of investigations or reports to exclude enforced sterilizations. 3 2 In fact, it specifically endorsed a broad mandate which could have included systemic abuses such as coerced surgical sterilizations. 3 3 Although the CVR's Final Report did recognize the rights of women and the gross violations of human rights-including finding rape to be an instrument of torture-committed against women largely by the Peruvian Armed Forces, it still fell short by excluding gross, systematic human rights abuses of enforced sterilizations against mainly low-income, indigenous Quechua women. 3 4 Because the decree did not make distinctions between those human rights violations directly related to insurgency or counterinsurgency measures and those violations tangentially related, the Commissioners should not have made such distinctions that have led to the exclusion of more than 200,000 cases of enforced sterilizations from the Commission's Final Report. 135 In doing so, the Commission allowed Lima, the capital city and center of political discourse and pub- lic opinion, to remain "emotionally distant" from these victims of Statesupported violence and helped to further alienate many victims from the CVR's work. 1 36 In this regard, the CVR helps to perpetuate and legitimize physical, racial, and class divides in Peruvian society and impedes public support for accountability and reproductive justice through the rule of law. 137 Additionally, the CVR Commissioners' reasoning did not apply in all cases since they were inconsistent when they investigated and published other crimes Fujimori committed-largely in the context of political corruption and authoritarian rule-during his regime that may not directly relate to the insurgency or counter-insurgency 1 38 Because incontrovertible evidence that demonstrated high levels of state and political corruption naturally affected Peruvians with economic and political power, public outrage and media coverage demanded that the CVR investigate and record those atrocities. 139 Therefore, those abuses of power became part of the historical record, and efforts today continue to push for accountability and criminal responsibility for the corruption crimes that Fujimori committed against Peruvians. 14 In the end, this inconsistency and selective treatment of cases demonstrates that, at least for the excluded victims of enforced sterilization, the truth-seeking process cannot be seen as "more than the reconfiguration of government pacts or domination between elites." 141 As a result, in this version of reconciliation, the same speakers are speaking and the same voiceless victims are silenced.
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B. Enforced Sterilizations of Quechua Women as Genocide
The Elements of Genocide
When a Congressional subcommittee investigated cases of enforced sterilizations and issued its report, it accused the Fujimori regime of committing genocide against the Quechua people through the Family Planning Program. 143 There are arguments for and against classifying these cases of enforced sterilizations as acts of genocide, and these arguments will be discussed below. 144 Ultimately, however, the victims of these human rights abuses need an impartial, independent investigation to take these issues out of the political realm and into the discourse of individual and collective reparations as well as reproductive justice. 45 First, the term "genocide" combines the Greek word genos (race or tribe) with the Latin suffix -ide (killing), and is the intentional killing, destruction or extermination of groups or members of a group. 146 The crime of genocide is recognized as part of customary international law and a part of jus cogens, the body of peremptory international norms.
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In addition, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as follows:
[A] ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) The definition deliberately omits acts of cultural and political genocide, and the Convention provides an ineffective enforcement through domestic trials in the state where the genocide occurred. 1 49 Much progress, however, has occurred at the international level to prosecute and punish perpetrators of genocide. For example, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) provide for criminal action against perpetrators of genocide. 150 The ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have tried individuals charged with genocide and have delivered landmark decisions that shape the evolving standards and norms for this crime against humanity. 151 In order to prove genocide, victims must fall under one or more of the definition's enumerated groups. 15 2 To determine whether an enumerated group exists in a particular case, a court may analyze subjective criteria, objective criteria, or both. 153 In a subjective analysis, the court "tak[es] into account the relevant evidence and the political and cultural context of the society concerned" on a case-by-case basis. 1 54 For instance, in the case of Rwanda, the court examined the perceptions of Hutu and Tutsi members as well as Rwandan authorities adopted from colonial rule that Hutus and Tutsis belonged to two distinct ethnic groups. 155 Alternatively, the court may use objective facts that indicate a population is a group with a distinct identity, such as state recognition or customary practices.' 5 6 In the case of Rwanda, the government required every citizen to carry identity cards displaying their ethnic identity as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and the country's legislation at the time referred to citizens by their respective ethnic groups. 2, 1998) . 152 See KrrICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 69. 6, 1999) ).
In addition, a perpetrator commits genocide through the defimition's enumerated discriminatory acts or omissions with the necessary mens rea. 158 These acts or omissions, however, do not necessarily involve the actual extinction or annihilation of the group, and motive is not an element of the crime of genocide. 59 Thus, the individual accused of genocide must have either known or should have known that "his act [or omission] would destroy, in whole or in part [the] protected group." 60 In contrast to the crime against humanity of persecution, which requires a discriminatory intent, genocide requires that the prosecution prove the accused possessed the specific intent to destroy a particular group beyond a reasonable doubt. 161 In order to prove genocidal intent, the prosecution must show that the accused wanted either to destroy a large number of group members or to exterminate a limited number of group members selected because their annihilation would greatly impact the group's survival. 62 Thus, killing or sterilizing a large number of women group members who are of child bearing age can be considered genocide even though they do not comprise a large percentage of the group's population. 63 Also, the accused must form his specific intent to commit genocide before acting in furtherance of the genocidal intent.
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Although the crimes committed must demonstrate genocidal intent, the prosecution can prove the element of intent by inferring from "facts such as words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful action that deliberately, consistently, and systematically targets victims on account of their membership of a particular group while excluding the members of other groups." 165 Evidence to construct genocidal intent may include the general context of other acts committed against the same group, the physical targeting of the group, the extent of bodily injury, the methodical nature of planning, and the scale of actual or attempted de- 166 In the end, even though it is difficult to prove genocidal intent in the case of an individual backed by the State, proving the required specific intent for genocide is somewhat easier than originally anticipated through the use of circumstantial evidence. 167 
Applying the Elements of Genocide Under the Convention to the Case of Enforced Sterilizations in Peru
A strong case can be made that the enforced sterilizations of more than 200,000 low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women were acts of genocide. 168 First, the indigenous Quechua-speaking women are members of two protected groups enumerated in the defmition of genocide since the Quechua people are a distinct racial and ethnic group in Peru. 169 The indigenous Quechua people objectively belong to a racial group since they share common, constant, and hereditary features, and are an ethnic group since they are "a community of persons linked by the same customs, the same language and the same race." 170 Additionally, from a subjective analysis, the racial and ethnic divides among criollos, mestizos, cholos, and indigenas in Peruvian society also contribute to the notion that the Quechua people are a distinct cultural group. 171 Although the overt motive behind Fujimori's Family
Planning Program was to curb population growth and to alleviate poverty on a massive scale, it is clear that because motive is not an element of genocide, indigenous Quechua women would not lose their protected group status. 172 In other words, their protected status as members of a racial or ethnic group would override their status as a member of a particular social demographic. 73 Therefore, the motive of population control would not negate an intention to prevent births within the Ha quedado demonstrado la necesidad de frenar lo mis pronto posible el crecimiento demogrfifico y urge, adicionalmente, un tratamiento para los excedentes existentes: utilizaci6n generalizada de esterilizaci6n en los grupos culturalmente atrasados y econ6micamente pauperizados .... Los mkodos compulsivos deben tener solo ciracter experimental, pero deben ser norma en todos los centros de salfid la ligadura de trompas .... Hay que discriminar el excedente poblacional y los sectores nocivos de la poblaci6n. Para estos sectores, dado su ciracter de incorrigibles y la carencia de recursos ... solo queda su exterminio total.
Id. 179 Id. (author's translation).
[Vol On the other hand, there are legal and practical concerns with classifying the enforced sterilization of Quechua women as an act of genocide. 182 For example, one could argue that the State did not administer population control and family planning programs to Quechua women to the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups from enforced sterilization procedures. 183 This argument is weak, however, because perpetrators of genocide can theoretically have the specific intent to destroy more than one protected group under the auspices of a single State-sponsored plan to eradicate poverty and curb population growth through sterilization procedures. 184 Also, as a practical matter, conservative groups in Peru and abroad who oppose contraception and reproductive choice for women have capitalized on the classification of the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program as an act of genocide. 18 5 As a result, international human rights advocates who promote accountability and justice for crimes against humanity and genocide must make strategic choices since their decisions and actions could negatively affect future reproductive rights, choice, and health among Quechua women who have already been victims of State-enforced sterilization campaigns. 1 6
C. Enforced Sterilizations as Violations of Individual Human Rights
Aside from the viable claim that the systematic enforced sterilizations against Quechua women constituted an act of genocide, these actions also implicate numerous violations of other human rights, includ- 92 The protective provisions enumerated within these instruments include those that protect the right to personal autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, and autonomous decision-making in women's reproductive lives. 193 For instance, the Peruvian Constitution guarantees all Peruvians the right to dignity; life; moral, psychological, and physical integrity; liberty and security of the person; and to be free from all forms of violence and from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 194 Thus, the State has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights through national laws and legal mechanisms to investigate and punish violations. In the case of enforced sterilizations, the Peruvian government has enacted laws to protect women; however, these laws are not enforced and violators continue to enjoy impunity from punish- 197 Many of these national protections, however, are unenforceable or inaccessible to the low-income women-victims of the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program. 198 Thus, complaints to regional or international human rights bodies are also valid and actionable claims. 199 The
American Convention, for example, protects individuals' rights to life; personal integrity; health; to provide free and informed consent; privacy; equality; and non-discrimination. 2 00 Public health care providers violated these rights when they performed unnecessary surgery on women-victims without obtaining informed consent, as well as when, in certain circumstances, they failed to perform preliminary examinations or to give post-operative care, which ultimately led to death and disability for women-victims.
Under the ICCPR, Peru has committed itself to respect, protect and fulfill its citizens' civil and political rights, including the rights to life, non-discrimination, gender equality, liberty, personal security, and privacy, along with freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 2 0 2 Additionally, the ICESCR protects the rights to non-discrimination, equality, and health. 20 3 Similarly, under the CEDAW, Peru guarantees rights to women that protect against enforced sterilization under Articles 5, 12, and 16, which are further articulated in General Recommendations 19, 21, and 24.204 For example, in General Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee asks States to take measures to "prevent coercion in regard to fertility and reproduction." 205 All of these State duties at international law give individual women-victims of enforced sterilizations the ability to hold the Peruvian government responsible for the human rights violations committed against them.
The Peruvian government officially acknowledged State responsibility for violations of international law under the American Convention when it settled the case of Maria Mamrita Mestanza Chdvez v. Peri. 2 6 Specifically, the settlement agreement recognized State violations of the victim's rights to life, physical integrity, humane treatment, equal protection of the law, and freedom from gender-based violence. 20 7 Although settlement agreements with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are not binding jurisprudence at international law, these recognitions of State responsibility are highly persuasive admissions to use in any further legal action at the regional or international levels. 208 Moreover, the Peruvian government undertook to investigate and punish those responsible for the violations as well as to reform legislation and create procedures to handle patient complaints within the health care system. 2 09 As a result, ongoing rights violations are occurring as long as Peru fails to implement these changes and denies women-victims their rights at national, regional, and international law.
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D. The Need for an Independent and Impartial Investigation
The CVR Commissioners recognized that other bodies within Peru's government and civil society either had conducted or were in the process of conducting their own investigations and reports on the cases of enforced sterilizations. 211 Although a Congressional subcommittee and numerous activist groups investigated and published testimonies and cases condemning the State's Family Planning Program and its health care providers, members of each of these bodies had a specific political or social interest in advocating certain positions and conclusions. 2 12 In contrast, the CVR was in a unique and disinterested position to evaluate, as it could have based "conclusions and recommendations on a close study of the record, while standing as an independent institution separate from the systems under review." 213 Opinion polls in Lima confirmed the public confidence in the performance of the CVR and the positive impact the public saw the Final Report have on Peru. 214 In addition, most individuals opined that the government should implement the CVR's recommendations for reparations, reform, and justice. 215 The CVR's widespread public support and overall legitimacy helped create some institutional momentum to keep the possibility of criminal justice and accountability open for the future, but only for those cases investigated and reported. 2 1 6 Thus, the exclusion of State-sponsored enforced sterilizations in the Final Report effectively impeded future criminal judicial action for thousands of marginalized Quechua women in Peru.
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The conservative Congressional Committee members who submitted the final report on conclusions and recommendations in cases of State-led enforced sterilization campaigns have politicized these human rights abuses and have used human rights language to strategically restrict reproductive choice for Peruvian women through repeals of laws that make surgical sterilization a legal option for reproductive choice in 210 See id. Peru. 218 As mentioned above, these conservatives are utilizing their investigation and report on human rights abuses to recommend committing further human rights abuses against women. 219 During the Toledo regime, reproductive rights and health advances had nearly halted. 220 For example, new policy initiatives stress abstinence-only methods for sexually transmissible infection (STI) prevention and natural methods for family planning. 2 21 In addition, government agencies have stopped promoting gender equality and sexual education, and health officials have prevented access to services and information on modern methods of contraception. 222 These programs and future strategies have further subordinated women in Peruvian society and have increased reliance on natural reproductive methods and unsafe abortions. 223 Including the cases of enforced sterilizations in the CVR Final Report or even creating a separate impartial truth commission investigating and reporting these State-sponsored abuses could have served to prevent claims of genocide from instilling fear and causing a conservative backlash in reproductive rights issues. 224 In addition, including these cases in the Commission's report could have created a legitimate independent declaration of human rights abuses as acts of genocide and as individual violations of reproductive choice and health. 225 Moreover, including these cases could have kept these human rights atrocities out of the political arena and in the hands of the victims who deserve retribution, reparations, and reconciliation. 2 26 Although including these abuses would not have guaranteed a tangible victory for the victims or their families, it would have constituted a moral, symbolic victory for low-income, rural Quechua women and a step forward in an uphill battle for recognition as Peruvian citizens. 2 27 Though the Peru-vian government has issued a public apology for its mass sterilization campaign, excluding these cases from any commission of inquiry greatly reduces the possibility of individual accountability for the perpetrators and justice for the victims of enforced sterilizations in Peru.
CONCLUSION
A distinctive feature of truth commissions is their focus on victims, reconciliation, and healing as well as their reporting to create a framework to ensure transitional justice as a mechanism to deal with a nation's past human rights abuses. 229 One problem, however, is that truthtelling can never be comprehensive enough to encompass all of the competing perceptions of past events. 230 In addition, healing and justice-especially in the field of reproductive rights and justice-seem incompatible and unworkable where victims have no political power or economic means to reconcile and rebuild their communities. 231 Complex analyses by truth commissions, however, can produce a record and collective memory to prevent future human rights violations, and the exclusion of certain abuses creates a void in the attempt at finding truth, reconciliation, and justice for transitional states. For more than 200,000 indigenous Quechua-speaking women in Peru, time has not healed their wounds of the past. These individuals deserve a legitimate, independent, and thorough investigation of the human rights abuses committed against them. Even if a lack of resources impedes the possibility for adequate monetary reparations or legal action for reproductive justice, a good faith inquiry to uncover the truth and an acknowledgement of past wrongs would constitute an important symbolic victory for indigenous rights, reproductive rights, and human rights for the indigenous Quechua peoples of Peru. Restoring dignity and recognizing individual rights of Quechua women could succeed as a step toward bridging the economic, racial, and ethnic divides that continue to perpetuate inequality, discrimination, and hatred among Peruvians. 228 See AQV, supra note 56, at 108; Coe, supra note 29, at 65; supra notes 8 and 12. For a discussion on the issues and problems surrounding reparations and public apologies, see generally MiIow, supra note 4. 229 See MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-TER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 60-61 (1998). 230 See id. at 62. 231 See id. at 63. Official acknowledgment of the truth is extremely powerful in the healing process, especially in an atmosphere previously dominated by official denial. 2 33 If this is the case, then no official acknowledgment of truth after official denial can be equally powerful in impeding reconciliation and healing. When truth commissions deprive certain individuals or groups of the opportunity to have their stories entered into the historical record, they effectively-even if inadvertently--deny victims access to the public and political discourse and leave victims disempowered in their struggle for justice and accountability. Future truth commissions, thus, should ensure that the marginalized victims in society do not remain silenced and alienated in the creation of the historical record and collective memory. When forgotten, history does have a tendency to repeat itself.
